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NON COOPERATIVE COLLUSION UNDER 
IMPERFECT PRICE INFORMATION 
BY EDWARD J. GREEN AND ROBERT H. PORTER'
Recent work in game theory has shown that, in principle, it may be possible for firms in 
an industry to form a self-policing cartel to maximize their joint profits. This paper 
examines the nature of cartel self-enforcement in the presence of demand uncertainty. A 
model of a noncooperatively supported cartel is presented, and the aspects of industry 
structure which would make such a cartel viable are discussed. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
LONG-STANDING QUESTIONS about how widespread is the occurrence of collusion 
in industries having several firms, and about the extent to which the performance 
of industries experiencing such collusion departs from the competitive norm, 
continue to provoke spirited debate. In this paper we offer a theory of collusive 
industry equilibrium which will provide a means of clarifying these questions. 
In his classic paper "A Theory of Oligopoly" [15], George Stigler appealed to,, 
dynamic considerations to explain how apparently cooperative industry perfor{ 
mance might result from noncooperative motives. According to this theory, thd 
firms of an industry form a cartel, which is designed to enforce monopolistiqi 
conduct in a self-policing way. "Self-policing" means precisely that the agreed-) 
upon conduct is noncooperatively viable and that it remains so over time. 
; 
Stigler's theory differs markedly from traditional oligopoly theories based on 
static equilibrium concepts (e.g., Cournot and Stackelberg). This difference is 
particularly striking in the case of an industry structure which is essentially 
immune from entry. The traditional theories would suggest that the performance 
of s11ch an industry should be largely determined by its degree of concentration 
-the number of firms in the industry and their relative sizes-and by the extent 
to which substitute goods are available. In contrast, Stigler suggested that the 
greatest obstacle to collusion in the absence of entry would be what he character­
ized as "secret price cutting." By informally relating concentration and various 
other features of industry structure to the immunity of a cartel from entry and to 
its ability to deter inimical firm behavior, and by assuming that industry 
profitability reflects successful operation of a cartel, he justified the use of 
cross-industry regressions to test his theory. 
The obvious interpretation of Stigler is that he made explicit a theory of
oligopoly which implicitly conceived of a cartel as a "policeman" which with 
some frequency is required to punish destabilizing "offenses" of individual cartel 
1 We have accepted the generous help of many colleagues in the course of this research. We would 
particularly like to thank C. Berry, T. Bresnahan, J. Friedman, J. Mirrlees, S. Sa!op, H. Son­
nenschein, and R. Willig. Robert Porter's research received support from a Sloan Foundation grant 
to the University of Minnesota Economics Department. 
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members. The somewhat different interpretation of this paper is that Stigler had 
a view of cartel organization as an instance of an optimization problem: to 
design an institution which achieves an efficient equilibrium outcome subject to 
the constraint that agents in the institution behave noncooperatively. On this 
interpretation, the optimal cartel structure may be one which provides member 
firms with strong positive incentives which make collusive behavior attractive, 
rather than one which provides insufficient incentives and which severely 
punishes defecting firms after the fact. 
In fact, two formulations of the cartel problem exist already which treat 
non cooperative collusion in a rigorous way. Osborne [8] proposes a reaction 
function equilibrium in which firms respond to changes in output by other firms 
in order to maintain their proportionate share of industry output. (See also the 
extensions of Spence [13, 14].) Knowing that other firms will respond in this 
manner, each firm will realize that it does not pay to deviate from the collusive 
output level. 
Friedman [3], on the other hand, outlines a strategy in which firms respond to 
suspected cheating, which they infer from a drop in the market price below the 
price that obtains when all firms produce at agreed-upon levels, by producing at 
Cournot levels thereafter. If future profit streams are discounted sufficiently 
slowly, then a firm would reduce the discounted value of its returns by failing to 
collude. Therefore, for all firms to adopt the collusive strategy would be a 
noncooperative equilibrium. 
The trouble with these formulations, from an applied industrial organization 
viewpoint, is that incentives in these equilibria are so perfect that the deterrent 
mechanisms are never observed. Then it may be difficult to infer from economet­
ric time-series evidence whether the observed market data is the outcome of a 
quasicompetitive or collusive equilibrium (cf. T. Bresnahan [2]). The substance of 
the present contribution is that this perfection is an artifact of the certainty world 
in which these models are formulated. When the considerations of imperfect 
information, which played a decisive role in Stigler's theory, are reintroduced, 
optimal incentive structures may involve episodic recourse to the kind of short­
run unprofitable conduct which would have been characterized as "price wars" 
or "punishment" previously. 
Our argument has three parts. First, we frame a precise definition of collusion 
in terms of industry conduct. Second, we show that collusive conduct may, in a 
particular industry structure, result in a pattern of industry performance marked 
by recurrent episodes in which price and profit levels sharply decrease. Thus we 
reject the received view that performance of this type necessarily indicates an 
industry where firms are engaging in a sequence of abortive attempts to form a 
cartel. Since this opinion is often used as a basis to deny the need for interven­
tion to promote competition in such industries (because the market purportedly 
is already withstanding the collusive assaults), our argument suggests the need to 
re-examine a widely-held assumption about policy. 
Third, we point out that the distinctive character of the phenomenon just 
discussed and the necessary appearance of this phenomenon if collusion is to 
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take place (given the particular industry structure in question) make it possible to 
draw clear-cut conclusions about the presence or absence of collusion in some 
specific industries on the basis of market data. This is a singular opportunity to 
learn about whether collusion does indeed exist in situations where it might 
plausibly occur, without having to face the many problems of interpretation 
surrounding the usual cross-industry tests of its extent.2 
2. COLLUSION UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
Collusive equilibria exhibiting stable performance may possibly characterize 
some industries. For instance, a market might be segmented geographically 
because firms have divided it. As long as this agreement was adhered to, each 
firm would be a monopolist within its area. Moreover, poaching by one firm in 
another's territory would be quickly and surely detected, and would invite 
retaliation. In that situation, no one would poach. All that would ever be 
"observed" is monopolistic conduct.3 
Similarly, in an industry in which contracts are awarded by competitive 
bidding, a scheme to rotate winning bids might be perfectly enforceable. Each 
firm would act as a monopolist when its turn came, and would clearly see that 
bidding low out of turn would jeopardize a profitable arrangement. Again, only 
monopolistic conduct would ever be "observed."4 
We will study a model in which demand fluctuations not directly observed by 
firms lead to unstable industry performance. Intuitively firms will act monopolis­
tically while prices remain high, but they will revert for a while to Cournot 
behavior when prices fall. Specifically, it will be assumed that firms agree on a 
"trigger price" to which they compare the market price when they set their 
production. 5 Whenever the market price dips below the trigger price while they 
have been acting monopolistically, they will revert to Cournot behavior for some 
fixed amount of time before resuming monopolistic conduct. 
Suppose that, at a given time, firms are supposed to be colluding (i.e., they 
expect one another to collude). If a firm produces more than its share of the 
monopoly output, its net return at that time will increase. However, by increasing 
the probability that the market price will fall below the trigger price, the firm 
incurs a greater risk that the industry will enter a reversionary episode during 
which profits will be low for everyone. For producing its monopolistic share to be 
2These problems, involving both the nature of the cross-industry data and also the logical 
difficulties of using it as a basis for inference are described in the essays by J. McGee, H. Demsetz, 
and L. Weiss in [4]. 
3·A referee has suggested that the U.S. steel industry employed such an enforcement device in the 
first half of this century. 
4For example, a "phases of the moon" system has been used to allocate low-bidding privileges in 
the high voltage switchgear industry. (See Scherer [12, Chapter 6].) 
5It is logically possible for this agreement to be a tacit one which arises spontaneously. Neverthe­
less, in view of the relative complexity of the conduct to be specified by this particular equilibrium 
and of the need for close coordination among its participants, it seems natural to assume here that the 
equilibrium arises from an explicit agreement. 
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the firms' noncooperatively optimal action, the marginal expected loss in future 
profits from possibly triggering a Cournot reversion must exactly balance (in 
terms of present discounted value) the marginal gain from over-producing. For 
appropriate distributions of the demand disturbance, reversionary episodes will 
sometimes occur without any firm defecting, simply because of low demand. 
Thus, over a long period, both Cournot behavior and collusive behavior will be 
observed at various times. In this respect, collusion under uncertainty differs 
markedly from the collusive equilibria under certainty discussed earlier. The fact 
that both monopolistic and Cournot performance are observed will make it 
possible to identify statistically the collusive equilibrium under uncertainty. 
We now address the question of exactly what sort of industry our model might 
{appropriately describe. Such an industry would have a structure possessing four 
L features. 
• 
• 
•· 
First, the industry is presumed to be stable over time. Temporal stability is 
required if the assumption that firms have rational expectations-an assumption 
which underlies the use of Nash equilibrium-is to be credible. On a more 
technical level, it justifies the use of stationary dynamic programming to charac­
terize equilibrium.6 
Second, output quantity is assumed to be the only decision variable which 
firms can manipulate. In particular, firms should not be able to engage in 
product differentiation or have ability to divide their market regionally. With 
firm decisions so restricted, asymmetric cartel incentive schemes are ruled out. In 
particular, even if one firm were suspected of violating a cartel agreement, other 
firms would have no way of isolating it and punishing it differentially. 
Third, except for each firm's private knowledge about its present and past 
production, information about the industry and its environment is public. The 
Nash equilibrium assumption presupposes that firms have an accurate idea of 
their competitor's cost functions, for example. Also, for firms to coordinate 
effectively in keeping track of whether the industry is in a collusive or a 
reversionary state, they must all observe the realization of a common variable. 
Fourth, the information which firms use to monitor whether the cartel is in a 
collusive or reversionary state must be imperfectly correlated with firms' conduct. 
Otherwise, if compliance were optimal for firms in collusive periods, reversion 
would never occur. Price is not the only information variable which could be 
used for monitoring-price data with correction for a systematic demand compo­
nent, or market share information, would also be subject to error. However, this 
assumption of imperfect information is incompatible with transactions in the 
industry being few and publicly announced (e.g., with individual contracts being 
awarded on the basis of sealed-bid auctions) or with completely accurate and 
current market�share information being available to firms. 
6Radner [11] considers the case of time·average utilities. His work relies essentially on the 
measurability of utility in the tail sigma.field of payoffs, which asymptotic·average utility satisfies. In 
contrast, discounted utility is not measurable with respect to the tail sigma.field, so that our work is 
not directly comparable to [11]. 
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In our model firms monitor market price, which imperfectly reflects the output
levels of other firms. We assume that the products of the firms are of homoge­
neous quality, and so they face a common market price. This structure is adopted 
for expositional ease. An environment in which firms monitored their own 
market share, which imperfectly reflected the price choices of other firms, would 
be more in the spirit of Stigler's paradigm. 
We now give a formal description of collusion under uncertainty as a Nash 
equilibrium in contingent strategies. Consider an oligopoly of n firms which 
produce an undifferentiated product in a stationary and time separable environ­
ment. This environment is like that described in Friedman [3], except that 
demand is subject to multiplicative uncertainty. Specifically, i, j range over firms
1, ... , n. wi: R� � R is the return function of i. wi(xi, p) is i's net return from 
producing X; units and selling at price p. f3 is the discount rate. Firms are risk 
neutral and maximize E[L;;"�of3',,.;(X;,,p,)]. Observed price p, = O,p(L:7�1 x;,), 
where p : R + -> R + . The random variables 0, are i.i.d. with c.d.f. F having 
continuous density J. E(O) = I. Each O, is a demand shock which firms cannot 
observe directly.7 
A contingent strategy for firm i is an infinite sequence si = (sm,sil• . . .  ), where
siO is a determinate initial output level x10, and sit+ 1 : R �
+ 1 � R + determines i's
output level at time t + 1 as a function of past prices by sit+ 1(p0, ••• , p,) = xii+ 1•
The choice of domain reflects the assumption that firms do not observe rivals' 
production levels directly. 
A strategy profile (sp ... , s") determines recursively a stochastic process of 
prices, which in turn induces a probability distribution on the space of infinite 
sequences of prices. Expectation with respect to this distribution will be denoted 
by Es1 ... s,,·
A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile (sf, ... , s:) which satisfies 
(I) 
:::; E,1 . . .,,. ... ,,�[ � [3',,.;(s;�(po, · · · ,p,_1),p,) l
t=O 
for all firms i and feasible strategies S;. 
Now consider how the industry might produce at a monopolistic level most of 
the time (i.e., except during reversionary episodes) in a Nash equilibrium in 
trigger price strategies. Firms will initially produce their respective shares of this 
restricted industry output, and will continue to do so until the market price falls 
below a trigger price p. Then they will produce Cournot outputs for the duration 
(we will specify this to be T- I periods) of a reversionary episode, regardless of 
7 James Friedman has suggested to us that the variables 01 might alternatively be specified to be a 
martingale, so that the prices p, would also be a martingale. This property ought to be satisfied if the 
good is a durable, or if consumption is perfectly substitutable across times. We retain the i.i.d. 
specification which makes the analysis simpler, but acknowledge that it is restrictive. 
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/�hat happens to prices during this time. At the conclusion of the episode, T
. periods after the price drop, they will resume monopolistic production. This will 
continue until the next time that p, <ft, and so forth.8 
Formally, let y = (y,, ... , y,) be a profile of restricted outputs, and let 
z = (z1, • • •  , z,) be a Cournot output profile. Choose a price level Ji and a length 
of time T. Define time t to be normal if (a) t = 0, or (b) t - l was normal and
Ji<;, p,_1, or (c) t- T was normal and Pi-T <Ji. Define t to be reversionary 
otherwise. Define strategies for firms by 
{ Y; xit = 
Z; 
if t is normal, 
if t is reversionary. 
These are well-defined policy strategies. 
; Each firm faces a stationary two-state (normal and reversionary) T-stage 
!' Markov dynamic programming problem. Its optimal policy is to produce z; in
, reversionary periods, and to produce some fixed quantity r in normal periods. 
Let V;(r) be the expected discounted present value of firm i if it sets X;, = r in 
normal periods. Define 
W; = 2: yj,y1(r) = E9w;(r,Bp(r + w;)), 
j¥:-i 
In normal periods, i anticipates that the aggregate output of the other firms will 
be w1, and so Y;(r) is the expected profit of then producing r. The expected profit 
in reversionary periods is 81• Let Pr(-) denote probability with respect to the 
distribution of 0. We assume that y;(y;) > 81 for each firm i. Then V, satisfies the 
functional equation 
(2) V,(r) = Y;(r) + f3Pr(Ji <;, Bp(r + W;}) V,(r)
+Pr(Bp(r + W;} <Ji) [ ��II /3'8; + /3TV,(r) l 
Pr(Bp(r + w;) <p) = F(p/p(r + w1)), so (2) is equivalent to
Y;(r) + F(p/p(r + W;))(( /3 - f3T)/(l - /3))8;
V,(r) = 
1 - f3 + (/3- f3T) F(Ji/p(r + w;)) 
(3) 
Thus the expected discounted present value of firm i equals what it would be 
in a Cournot environment, plus the single-period gain in returns to colluding, 
appropriately discounted. Inequality (!), the defining condition for Nash equilib-
8For simplicity, we are considering only the simplest variant of a trigger price strategy. For 
example, firms might condition T on the amount by which p exceeds the observed market price. 
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rium, can now be rewritten 
(4) V;(r) '.'.: V;(y;) for all rand i.
The first-order condition for (4) is 
(5) V;'(y;) = 0 for all i. 
Using the fact that (j / g)' = 0 if and only if f' g -Jg' = 0, (5) is equivalent to
(6) 0 = [1-,e+c,e-,BTJF (p1pC�"Y1))]r:cy;)
+ (,B -,BT)f(pfpc�nY1) )[ pp'C�nY1) I (PC�n Y1) rJ
X (Y;(J;) - 8;) 
for all i. 
Equation (6) states that the marginal return to a firm from increasing its, 
production in normal periods (yf(y;)) must be offset exactly by the marginal:
increase in risk of suffering a loss in returns ( y;(y;) - 8;) by triggering a .
reversionary episode. When this condition holds for all firms, n differential 
constraints are placed on the n-dimensional vector y of restricted outputs in
equilibrium. Thus, the assertion that an equilibrium which satisfies an additional 
constraint exists will require careful justification. In particular, the output profile 
which maximizes total returns to the industry may not be supportable in 
equilibrium.9 
There are two related final observations about the formal model of collusion 
under uncertainty. First, no firm ever defects from the cartel. More precisely, no1 
firm i has any private information that would lead it to assess its return function 
'TT; more accurately than its competitors do. Thus, every competitor is able to I figure out what i will do to maximize profits. The market price reveals informa­
tion about demand only, and never leads i's competitors to revise their beliefs 
·about how much i has produced. In equilibrium, the frequency of reversion from
normal states will be given by F(p / pC:i,y)). 
Second, despite the fact that firms know that low prices reflect demand 
conditions rather than overproduction by competitors, it is rational for them to·
participate in reversionary episodes. 1 0 Basically, a reversionary episode is just a
temporary switch to a Nash equilibrium in noncontingent strategies. It does not 
pay any firm to deviate unilaterally from its Nash strategy in this temporary 
9In [9] it is shown that, for symmetric firms under imperfect price information, the output profile 
for normal periods which will maximize discounted industry profits in a noncooperative equilibrium 
in trigger price strategies is different from the profile which would be chosen if the industry were a 
monopoly. I.e., firms forego some profits in normal periods in order to reduce the frequency and 
duration of reversion needed to provide appropriate incentives, if p and T are chosen to maximize
expected discounted profits subject to the incentive compatibility constraint (5). 
10To be precise, we argue here that the equilibrium is perfect or sequentially rational. A formal 
statement and proof of this assertion are given in rs1. 
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situation, any more than it would if the industry were permanently a Cournot 
industry. It might be asked why Cournot equilibrium is appropriate at all. If 
firms know at a particular time that a low price has been observed in the past, 
and that the cartel has had a perfect record of monopolistic conduct, why do 
firms not disregard the price and continue to act monopolistically? The answer is !:that everyone understands the incentive properties of equilibrium. If firms did
, not revert to Cournot behavior in response to low prices, equation (5) would not 
i'hold the rest of the time, so monopolistic behavior would cease to be individually
,optimal for firms. 
· We realize that the assumptions about industry structure are quite restrictive. 
We emphasize that the particular Nash equilibrium we are studying is not the 
only sort of Nash equilibrium which would be collusive according to the 
definition offered in this section, and that evidence that this particular Nash 
equilibrium occurs in a specific industry is not the only evidence relevant to 
forming an opinion about the extent of collusion in various sectors of the 
economy. However, even though the direct applicability of our model is severely 
limited, it would be valuable to examine an industry for which it would be 
appropriate. We believe that the American rail freight industry in the l880's was 
one example of an industry which satisfies our structural conditions quite well. 
Studies of that industry by Paul MacAvoy [7] and Thomas Ulen [16, 17] have 
produced qualitative conclusions which are consistent with our model. Recent 
econometric work by Porter [10] (based on the extensive time series data 
collected by Ulen) strengthens these conclusions. 
3. PRICE PROCESSES GENERATED BY COLLUSION
The equilibrium discussed in the preceding section is noteworthy because it 
reverses the traditional interpretations of a certain kind of industry price pattern. 
According to these traditional interpretations, an episode in which price drops 
sharply, remains low for some time, and then sharply rises again without there 
being an apparent cost or demand shock would indicate one of two possible 
events. The episode might be a symptom of the predatory reaction of incumbent 
firms to a threatened entry. Alternatively, it might signal (as in Stigler's theory) a 
breakdown of a cartel agreement followed by the reestablishment of the agree­
ment. In either case, such evidence would indicate the fragility of collusion 
among the incumbents. Thus, in the formulation of policy, it has sometimes been 
argued that intervention to promote competition would likely be redundant in 
markets where these episodes are already occurring. 
In marked contrast, such episodes play an essential role in the maintenance of 
an ongoing scheme of collusive incentives in the model presented here. While the 
traditional views would predict the transience of collusion in a market marked by 
these episodes of price depression, and with the demise of collusion also the 
cessation of the price instability which it engendered, our model suggests that 
industries having certain structural characteristics (i.e., the four characteristics 
enumerated in the previous section) will exhibit price instability as a feature of a 
NONCOOPERATIVE COLLUSION 95 
stable, time-stationary pattern of prices if its member firms are colluding. This 
observation raises the question of whether it is possible to estimate consistently, 
from the stochastic process of prices generated by a collusive equilibrium of the 
form described in Section 2, the trigger price p and the reversionary length T 
which determine that equilibrium. The answer to this question is affirmative. 
Moreover. there also exists an estimator which is computationally attractive and 
which has only a small asymptotic bias if the interval between price observations 
is short relative to both the length of reversionary episodes and the expected 
length of normal episodes-the situation which one would expect to encounter in 
an industry where collusion actually did confer significant market power on 
firms. 
While a discussion of estimation per se lies beyond the scope of this paper, we 
characterize in the Appendix the stochastic process of prices which arises in the 
equilibrium of the model presented in Section 2. It can be shown that any data 
series of prices may be treated as a sample path of a stationary ergodic process. 
This result provides a foundation for the study of asymptotic properties of 
estimation of the model, because it justifies the use of the ergodic theorem [1, 
Theorem 6.28] to generalize the role which the law of large numbers plays in the 
estimation theory of independent processes." (In particular, the existence of 
consistent estimators of p and T is a consequence of the ergodic theorem.) In the 
Appendix, the price process will be compared to an alternative process which is a 
Markov version of the well-known Bernoulli switching process (cf. [6]). It can be 
shown that a data series of prices may be regarded as a "contaminated sample 
path" of the alternative process, and the degree of contamination will be 
computed as a function of the true parameters of the equilibrium. 
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APPENDIX 
To begin, consider a very general definition of the class of stochastic processes which will be under 
consideration. The observed price process { X1} iEN will be determined by two processes { Y1} rEN• the' 
price process which would ensue if all periods were normal (i.e., if the industry were to produce the 
restricted output vector y at all times), and {Z1}1EN• the price process which would ensue if all 
periods were reversionary (i.e., if the industry were to operate in Cournot equilibrium at all times, 
producing the output vector z). Whether the observed price is drawn from the normal or the 
reversionary distribution is determined by a process { W,} iEN• which specifies whether the industry is
in a normal or a reversionary state. Note that {X1}1EN is the only component of the joint process 
{( W,, X1, Y1, Z1)} iEN which is observed. 
11 A stochastic process is ergodic if every event definable in terms of the tails of sample paths (e.g., 
the set of sample points having convergent paths) has probability zero or one. The ergodic theorem 
extends the strong law of large numbers to such processes. 
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Formally, define a switching process to be determined by a probability space (Q, /3, m), a state 
space S, a subset N i_;:;; S, and four sequences of random variables { W} = { W1: 0-) S} ieN• {X}
= {X1: n-) IR.LeN• { Y} = { Y1: Q-) IR} reN• and { Z} = {Z,: 0--'l>iR} ieN which satisfy 
(Al) { Y} U { Z} is a set of independent r.v.'s, 
(A2) { Y }  is identically distributed with c.d.f. G, 
(A3) { Z }  is identically distributed with c.d.f. H, 
(A4) { W }  is a Markov process with stationary transition probabilities, 
(AS) 'VtS1EN""">X1= Y1w.p.I, 
(A6) Vt S1 fl; N�X, = z, w.p.1. 
Note that the special case of a switching process usually studied occurs when S = {O, 1 }, N = {O}, 
and ( W] is a Bernoulli process which is independent of { Y} U {Z}. 
In the case of a collusive price process, G and H are the c.d.f.'s of the normal and reversionary 
price distributions, respectively. S = {O, ... , T- 1} and N = {O}. (I.e., W1 = 0 signifies that the 
industry is in a normal period at time t.) The Markov process { W} is defined recursively by starting 
with an arbitrary W0: n--)> S, and then imposing 
(A7) if W,(w) - 0 and Y,(w) � p, then W1+ 1(w) = 0, 
(A8) if W,(w) - 0 and Y,(w) < p, then W1+1(w) = l ,
(A9) if W,(w) - k, 1$k<T-I, then W1+1(w) =k+ l, 
(A!O) if W,(w)- T- I, then W1+1(w) = 0, 
The process { W} defined by (A7)-(AIO) is Markov with stationary transition probabilities 
because, by (Al) and (A 2), { Y} is i.i.d. The transition graph of { W} is shown in Figure l, in which 
each arrow is labeled with its transition probability. 
The aim is to show that W0 can be chosen in such a way that { X} will be a stationary ergodic 
process. Conditions (A5) and (A6) show that X1(w) is a function of (W1(w), Y1(w), Z1(w)), so by [1, 
Proposition 6.32] it is sufficient to show that the joint process { W, Y, Z} is ergodic. By [1, Theorem 
7.16], this process is ergodic if it is a stationary Markov process having a unique invariant distribution 
(i.e., a unique distribution such that, if W1 is defined by (A7)-(AIO), then { W0 ,  Y0,Z0} and 
( W1, Y1, Zi) have identical joint distributions). This follows from [1, Theorem 7.18], completing the 
proof that { X} is ergodic. 
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In [lOJ, a maximum likelihood estimator for a switching process somewhat different from 
(Al)-(AlO) is used to study the pre-ICC rail freight cartel in the U.S. That process is obtained by 
replacing (Al), (A2), and (A7)-(AIO) with 
{ Y } is identically distributed with c.d.f., 
(Al I) 
J(p) �max[(! - G(p))-1(G(p)- G(p)),O j . 
(I.e., J is the distribution of p according to G, conditional on p � p.)
(Al2) 
and 
(Al3) 
{ W} U { Y} U { Z } is a set of independent random variables, 
{ W} is a stationary Markov process having the transition probabilities 
specified by Figure 2. 12 
That is, this process is defined by relaxing the usual assumption that the switching process is 
Bernoulli, while retaining the assumption that it is independent of the underlying variables which 
determine the observed prices. Call the process defined by (Al)-(AlO) the price process, and that 
defined by (A3)-(A5), (A 11)-(A 13) the approximating process. 
The advantage of the approximating process over the price process is that it permits adaptation of 
much of the work which has been done on maximum-likelihood estimation of the Bernoulli switching 
process. In particular, it is possible both to compute the ML estimator economically and to appeal to 
theoretical results asserting its consistency and asymptotic normality. The crucial question raised by 
use of the approximating process is of how seriously misspecified it is as a model for data actually 
generated by the price process. We now address this question. 
The basis for comparing the two processes is that, given a stationary price process ( W, X, Y, Z) 
with parameters (ji, T, G, H), a stationary approximating process { W', X', Y', Z'} with the same
12Using extensive information including industry prices, macroeconomic variables, and firm­
specific quantity data, Porter estimates the structural equations of a detailed industry model. His 
method may be viewed as an imposition of prior constraints on the reduced-form estimation 
described here. 
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parameters can be obtained by a kind of censoring. Looking at the matter from the opposite 
perspective. the sample paths of Z can be viewed as a contaminated (by reinsertion of the censored 
observations) version of the approximating process. The extent of the contamination is easily 
computable from the parameters of the process. If it is slight, and if the ML estimator is regarded as 
robust, then the ML estimator of the approximating process should also be considered to have small 
asymptotic bias as an estimator of the price process. 
The approximating process { W', X', Y', Z'} is defined from { W, X, Y, Z} simply by censoring the 
triggering events (i.e., the events in which W1 = 0 and Y1 < p). Formally, this is done by means of a 
sequence of stopping times { T1 : Q--j. NLeN· Define 
(AJ4) 
and 
(Al5) 
if W0(w) -0 and Y0(w) < p, 
otherwise, 
if W,..,<w) + 1(w) = 0 and Y,..,<wJ + 1(w) < p,
otherwise. 
Then define 
(AI6) 
Finally, take a set { Y,"LeN which are identically distributed with c.d.f. J and such that { Y} U 
( Z \ U { Y") is independent, and define 
(Al7) Y'(w) -
{ Y,,,",(w) 
1 Y/1 (w) 
if w;(w)-0, 
if W,'(w)>O. 
(N.B. The definition of the observed component {X'} of the approximating process is the same 
whether { Y'l is defined by (Al7) or by Y,'(w) = Yr,{w)(w) for all w. The reason for using (Al7) is both 
to satisfy (Al I) and to keep { W'} and { Y') independent so that (A12) is satisfied. Under the simpler
definition, (AJS) would have introduced dependency between them.) 
The effect of (AIS) and (A16) is to continue to let a low realization of Y, be the event which causes 
the state to change from zero to one, but to censor this event if it occurs. Thus the dependence of 
W,+ 1 on ( W,, Y,} in the price process is removed, and (A 12) holds. By the strong Markov property 
[1, Proposition 7.8], the censored process is a stationary Markov process, so (A13) holds. I.e., 
( W', X', Y', Z') is an approximating process with parameters (ft, T,J, H). 
It remains to calculate how much censoring of the price series X(w) is required to construct the 
approximating series X'(w). (Alternatively, how much contamination of X'(w) is required to recon­
struct X(w)?) Formally, what is lim,_,""(T1(w)- t)/T,(w)? If this quotient is close to zero for almost 
every w, then the asymptotic bias of the approximating-process ML estimator applied to data
generated by the price process should be small. 
To calculate the quotient, first define a( W, Y) = I if W = 0 and Y < p, and a( W, Y) = 0 
otherwise. By (Al4) and (Al5), T1(w) = t + ���3a(W, (w), Y.,(w)), or 
(Al8) 
By the ergodic theorem, 
(Al9) 
-r,(w) 
Jim -
(
1
) 
2; a(W, (w),Y,,(w))-m((W0-0,Y0<p))G(p) 1--+oo T1 W u=O a.s. 
(Recall that m is the stationary measure on 0.) Combining (A 18) and (A 19), and appealing to the fact 
that the stationarity of the price process forces W0 and Y0 to be independent, yields 
(A20) a.s. 
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The calculation of m({ W0 = O}) is an easy matter. For I � k < T- I , by (A9) and stationarity, 
we have 
(A21) m( { W0 � k)) � m( { W1 � k + I))� m( { W0 � k + I}).
Also, by (A7) and stationarity, we have 
(A22) m( { W0 � I})� m( { W1 � I))� m( { W0 � 0) )G(p).
Since the probabilities of the states sum to unity, (A21) and (A22) yield 
(A23) m({ W0 � 0)) �[I+ (T- l)G(jJ)i-1• 
Thus, by (A22) and (A23), 
(A24) 
. T,(w)-1 
( i-1 hm ( ) � G(p) I +(T- l)G(p) ./--)ooo T1 W 
For example, consider a hypothetical industry in which a trade association disseminates weekly 
price data to its members. I.e., the appropriate interpretation of a period in the discrete-time model is 
one week. Suppose that the parameters of this industry were estimated using the ML estimator for the 
approximating process, with the results that G(ft) = .025 and f = 11. Since the expected duration of
an episode of normal conduct is ( G(ji))-1, these estimates indicate that a reversionary episode occurs 
once a year on average, and lasts ten weeks. Thus there is (on average) one price observation a year 
(that being the observation of the price which triggers the reversionary episode), which would not be 
included if the approximating process were really generating the data. This is a contamination ratio 
of one in fifty, or (.025)[ 1 + .25]-1 which is the expression which is obtained from (A24). 
The ML estimator is computed by dividing the data into two sub-samples, one of which is 
presumed to have been drawn from distribution G and the other from H, and then estimating these 
distributions from the respective subsamples. If the "contaminating" observations were to comprise 
equal proportions of the two subsamples, then each subsample is being estimated with 2 per cent 
contamination, and one might reasonably suppose the discrepancy between the price process and the 
approximating process to be rather small. If all of the "contaminating" observations were assigned to 
the subsample presumed to be generated by normal conduct, then this subsample would have 2i per 
cent contamination, which still might reasonably be ignored. However, if the "contaminating" 
observations were all included in the subsample presumed to reflect reversionary conduct, then that 
subsample would have a 10 per cent contamination level. In this worst case, it is easy to imagine that 
the observations actually drawn from the lower tail of G would seriously bias the estimation of H. 
The parameter estimates for the example just given are approximately the same as those reported 
by Porter [10] for the rail freight industry. Thus, while the foregoing analysis is insufficiently precise 
to rule out the worst-case assumption concerning bias of his estimator relative to the price process, it 
has shown that under more optimistic assumptions the bias would plausibly be slight. While we 
acknowledge that there is an inevitable element of subjective judgment in a situation such as this, we 
suggest that Porter's study provides presumptive evidence that the rail freight industry may have 
exemplified the kind of equilibrium which has been studied here. 
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